In the 1960s Ida Macalpine and Richard Hunter, both psychiatrists, argued that George III's attacks were porphyria. The claim spread into textbooks and into the kind of dinner-table certainty that passes for medicine. Timothy J. Peters and D. Wilkinson re-examined the historical evidence in History of Psychiatry in 2010. Their abstract is a demolition, and it deserves to be given in substance, not softened. The porphyria diagnosis had gained wide acceptance. Their re-reading concludes that it is unlikely he had porphyria. Macalpine and Hunter's symptomatology and their historical method were flawed. They highlighted some symptoms, and they ignored, dismissed, or suppressed counter-evidence. The claim of discoloured urine, which matters a great deal in porphyria, is "exceedingly weak." The two authors, Peters and Wilkinson add, believed mental illness was primarily physical, and the royal diagnosis served that wider argument about psychiatry.
Reading Peters is not a license to re-diagnose the king. That would repeat the original mistake in a different direction. The lesson is smaller. A confident clinical noun attached to a dead monarch can travel for fifty years while the urine evidence, the symptom selection, and the agenda sit in the notes. Historians who adopted the label were often trusting physicians. The physicians were selecting from eighteenth-century medical notes, and those notes were written for a court in crisis, not for a modern metabolic clinic. The right response is to put the dispute in the open, not to swap porphyria for a newer favorite and speak as if the file had closed.
What a manual is for
The American Psychiatric Association describes the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision, as the standard classification of mental disorders used by mental health professionals in the United States. Its job, on the association's own page, is to help clinicians and researchers define and classify disorders so that diagnosis, treatment, and research can improve. It is revised by subject-matter experts against the scientific literature. It assumes a person who can be interviewed, observed, and, when the criteria require it, told what is being concluded.
George III cannot sit for that interview. Neither can anyone else whose letters you have been reading. Using a current criterion set backward, across a change in culture, record-keeping, and pharmacology, produces a resemblance, not a diagnosis. Resemblance can be a useful comparison if you label it as comparison. It becomes a counterfeit chart when the resemblance is printed as a fact about the body.
There is a professional rule aimed at the living that historians keep half-ignoring. In 1964, during Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign, Fact magazine surveyed psychiatrists about his mental fitness. The American Psychiatric Association condemned the spectacle. In 1973 it adopted section 7.3 of The Principles of Medical Ethics With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry. Jerome Kroll and Claire Pouncey, writing in the Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law in 2016, give the annotation in full. On occasion psychiatrists are asked for an opinion about someone "in the light of public attention." They may share expertise about psychiatric issues in general. "It is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he or she has conducted an examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement."
The rule is about living public figures and the press. It does not bind historians, and it does not mention the dead. The reason inside it still applies. No examination. No authorization. A dead person cannot grant either. Quoting the rule as if it were a 1973 ban on biography would be sloppy. Using it as a reminder that even psychiatrists refuse to diagnose at a distance, while essayists do it for sport, is fair.
What historians owe the record
The American Historical Association's Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct, revised over many years and current in the text the association published with a date of 7 January 2023, is not a medical code. It is strict about evidence. Historians "do not fabricate evidence." They "should report their findings as accurately as possible and not omit evidence that runs counter to their own interpretation." Macalpine and Hunter's method, as Peters and Wilkinson describe it (selected symptoms, suppressed counter-evidence) fails that standard whether or not one is a psychiatrist. A later writer who repeats "George III had porphyria" without the 2010 challenge fails it again, by omission.
Peters and Wilkinson do not ask you to take their word as a new royal diagnosis. They send you back to the historical evidence: attendants' notes from a court that already had a political crisis on its hands. A metabolic label has to survive those pages, including the pages that do not mention the symptom the label needs. If the discoloured urine is weakly attested, the label is weakly attested. That is an argument about evidence. It is not an invitation to pick a different chapter of the DSM and staple it to the same diaries.
The association also says something non-historians dislike: having a point of view is not the scandal. Pretending the record is complete is the scandal. You may notice that a king's rages strained his family and his ministers. You may say the court called him mad, because the court did. You may not convert the attendants' notes into a DSM code and call the conversion science. The AHA's phrase for the limit is plain enough: the record is fragmentary, and absolute historical knowledge is denied us.
Attachment language, which this site uses as a way of asking who stayed and who was sent away, is under the same rule. It can organize a question. It cannot sign a chart. "Anxious" as a historian's shorthand for a pattern of clinging in the letters is a metaphor. "Anxious" as a diagnosis is a clinical act. If you cannot mark which one you are doing, drop the word.
If the worry is about someone living
This page is about method. It is not care. If you are frightened for your own mind, or for someone who can still be seen by a doctor, the manual and the rule both point the same way: a licensed clinician who can examine the person and who has permission to speak. If someone is in immediate danger, contact local emergency services. In the United States, the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline answers for people in suicidal crisis. An argument about an eighteenth-century king will not help them, and it was never meant to.
The king can keep his symptoms in the physicians' diaries, disputed and dated. He does not need your certainty. The living person in front of you might.
When you next feel the click of a diagnosis settling on a historical figure, can you name the examination that never happened?
Sources
- Peters and Wilkinson, History of Psychiatry, 2010
- Peters and Wilkinson, PubMed abstract
- American Psychiatric Association: DSM-5-TR
- Kroll and Pouncey, Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 2016, text of APA section 7.3
- American Historical Association: Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct
History: Un-Attached
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